I really did not intend to leave you with a cliffhanger then go to commercial break, but I just read my last post about Capa making it to the beach and I realized that I have not explained to you, dear Reader, why I believe there is good evidence that he did, and why the Coleman Bros vehemently deny it. Ah, the pitfalls of blogging. The Darkroom post will come tomorrow, as promised, but in the meantime here’s a not-so-quick explanation that will make my interpretation of the darkroom “mishap” more apparent.
It all has to do with waves, tides and eyewitnesses.
Waves
Charles Herrick has been on the vanguard of proving that Capa arrived at Easy Red much later than he claimed, 0820, rather than 0740. Most of his arguments that I discuss here are presented in Chapter 10 of his book.
Herrick’s first proof that Capa arrived around 0820 involved Landing Tables for the 16th Regimental Combat Team, which showed a slot for a "press photographer" in the commander's vessel (Colonel Taylor), which was a LCM (landing craft mechanized). This was in the 13th wave, arriving along with one other vessel, a LCVP that contained the medical team, scheduled to arrive at 0805. Actual arrival time was between 0813 and 0824.
Capa had mentioned possibly going in with Company B of the 11th wave overall, second wave from the Chase, scheduled to arrive at 0750, but Herrick refutes this by saying that the Landing Tables were immutable. It was not possible to change the order once the operation was underway. I refer the reader to Herrick’s account to save space here, but his research on that seemed solid to me… at first glance.
Yet, Herrick also claims that Taylor switched boats at the last minute with the medical team. He chose to take his command crew on the LCVP, rather than the LCM, which means that the manifest was not immutable. We don't know if the entire manifest of both vessels swapped, or part of them. The capacity of an LCM was up to 100 troops, plus a crew of 4 to 6. The capacity of a LCVP was only 36 passengers, plus crew. These boats were packed tightly with men and equipment. Herrick omitted these capacity figures in his analysis.
Likely, there was not enough room for Capa on the smaller LCVP. We know from Herrick that Capa did switch boats, so it is conceivable that he switched waves. It seems reasonable that if Capa wanted to arrive at the beach earlier, had hoped for E Company but was stuck on a different ship, he would have taken this opportunity to jump in a LCVP with B Company. Herrick’s conclusive proof that Capa went in with Taylor falls apart with this knowledge and is refuted by an eyewitness (see below). Therefore, his arrival time on the beach becomes less certain.
There’s more…
Herick said that Capa left the Chase too late to get to the beach when he claimed. According to the U.S. Coast Guard, the branch that operated the landing craft, "The attack transport Samuel Chase, part of Task Group 124.3, arrived in the transport area 10 miles off Normandy's shore and anchored on the morning of June 6 at 3:15. The ship began embarking troops at 5:30 a.m. The first waves [there’s that word again] got underway at 5:36 a.m. and the last wave launched a little after 6 a.m."(35) Therefore, according to the Coast Guard, Capa must have left at or before 0600, which meant he could have been at the beach by 0740.
Just like bombers when they take off, these smaller boats circled in the water so that they could leave in a little armada, rather than dribbling in individually. Note the Coast Guard used the term, "wave," to mean the successive order of landing craft from this attack transport, not the overall Normandy invasion. The second wave from the Chase would be Company B, according to the U.S. Coast Guard, the company that Capa said he rode with. So, Clan Coleman's dismissal of Capa's claim to have been in the second wave appears to be more of a semantic argument than anything else.
Tides
A second method Herrick used to determine Capa's arrival time involved a military WRM equation, used to determine distance to an object. This is usually determined using a graduated reticle on an optical sight. Herrick used pictures. He compared Capa's negative 32 to a famous photograph made by Chief Photographer's Mate Robert F. Sargent commonly called, Into the Jaws of Death. Both photographs were taken from a LCVP, so at first glance this seems like a reasonable comparison to make. Sargent's LCVP arrived with Company E around 0740, according to the National Coast Guard Museum.(35)
Robert Sargent, Into the Jaws of Death
Herrick measured the vertical distance on these pictures from the top of an embankment to the bottom of a strip of shale. Never mind that these pictures were not taken at the same section of beach, which means we must assume the configuration of these landmarks was very similar in different locations, but the two photographs were made from different heights above the water. He said that the different widths of the landmarks proved that Capa was closer, which meant he came in much later.
But, Capa made his photograph from the bow of the LCVP after the men disembarked, Sargent was standing toward the heavier stern, so he would have been lower than Capa. With Capa’s higher vantage point, the landmarks in his pictures analyzed by Herrick would naturally have been wider (again, assuming the beach where Capa landed was nearly identical to where Sargent landed). Therefore, Herrick’s estimation does not mean that Capa was closer, and by extension, later than Sargent.
Beyond that, Capa and Sargent used entirely different optical systems. Capa used his 35mm Contax with a 50mm lens. Sargent used a large format 4x5 inch camera, probably a modified Graflex Speedmatic, but with an unknown lens, likely either a 135mm or 150mm lens. These two camera and lens combinations will give greatly different perspectives, object dimensions and images that are not comparable. Apples and oranges.
After explaining with math equations how he derived his conclusion of Capa’s later arrival based on the arguments above, Herrick admitted, "At best, we can only use the waterline as a very crude estimate..."
Herrick used similar logic when examining the hedgehogs in Capa’s picture vs. Sargent’s. Herrick points out the hedgehogs in Capa's Negative 32 are in deeper water than the hedgehogs in Sargent's picture, indicating again that the tide had risen significantly between the two pictures, therefore Capa could not have been there at 0740.
But when Capa entered the water he photographed the hedgehogs and log ramps close-up. Capa tells us, in negatives 34, 35, 36 and 38, that the hedgehogs and log ramps are sitting on the sand not covered by water, and the men are lying on their bellies on sand, not in water. Using Herrick's reasoning, this would imply that he was there earlier than Sargent.
Above is Negative 35, showing the men lying on sand. Herrick cherry picked a negative that showed men up to their waist in water, explaining the tide had raised the water level, proving Capa arrived later. But he knew those men were standing in a runnel, and that the picture did not accurately depict the level of the tide. The above picture does, and strongly suggests a much earlier time than Herrick claims.
The higher water in Capa’s negative 32 of the beach is not because of a rising tide, but because of a runnel, or deep channel, running parallel to the beach. There are multiple accounts of men beaching on sand, then wading through deep water the closer they got to shore, because of these runnels. Herrick knew this, because he talks about runnels in his book.
Herrick used specious arguments to support his theory that Capa’s arrival was more consistent with an 0830 timeframe than a 0740 timeframe. But the argument falls apart upon closer analysis.
After a lengthy discussion regarding these methods, Herrick concluded, "I'll leave it to the reader to decide."
Eyewitnesses
Three eyewitnesses put Capa on the beach before 0820, closer to 0740.
Sam Fuller's account may be the most disputed. I have, or will, discuss parts of it elsewhere, so I won’t spend any time on it here.
Captain Charles Hangsterfer was with the 1st Battalion of the 16th Infantry, that included A, B, C and D Companies. He landed on Easy Red at 0700, made his way to the beach and then further up to the bluff and paused for a break. He then went back to the beach to recover men from his company, when he saw, "Bob Capa, a combat photographer for a magazine taking pictures of the carnage. He was behind one of the self-propelled tanks that had been knocked out." Herrick quoted him as saying,
He was a civilian, he was paid to take pictures and he was behind this — one of these DD tanks that was knocked out. There were three of them out of a hundred, these DD tanks I started to tell you about, these tanks that were supposed to be our artillery support, and three of them got to shore out of a hundred and he was behind one of them, knocked out [inaudible] on the beach … taking pictures and I waved to him. I had seen him over in North Africa and he knew who I was and he took a picture of me, but the poor guy took all these pictures and none of them turned out … Somebody goofed up in the development of them and they never turned out. So I never had a picture of me on the beach there looking for my troopers... (36)
In his blog post #25, Coleman estimated that Hangsterfer saw Capa on the beach between 0735 and 0750, an estimate with which I agree. However, after Herrick posted his estimates to Coleman’s blog, Coleman changed his time estimates and attributed Hangsterfer’s memory to stolen or “borrowed glamor.” As we just saw, Herrick’s estimates are based on poor reasoning, in my opinion. Coleman was right initially, which supports my contention that Capa switched to B Company and did not go in with Colonel Thompson.
The third and best source was Lieutenant William Kays, who was a liason officer for the commander, Major Edmund Driscoll, First Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment. His LCVP landed on Easy Red at 0730.
Capa’s photograph of William Kays (on left with glasses) in a planning session the night before the invasion on board the USS Chase. Kays admitted that he inserted himself in this picture by the famous Life photographer.
Kays confirmed that the landing craft circled after they were launched, until all boats were in the water, "so we could arrive at the beach at the same time." Kays described standing at the rear of the LCVP with his radio operator and a runner, and "I found myself standing in front of the famous Life magazine photographer Robert Capa," at the right rear of the boat.
Upon seeing explosions on the beach, Kays recalled Capa saying, "That must be the beach engineers blowing up the obstacles." Kays described shallow water swirling around the obstacles and seeing the bodies of men lying at water's edge.
Kays described the boat being hit by machine gun fire, causing his radio operator, Doyle, to panic. Two soldiers removed the radio from his back. Kays indicated that Capa's photos depict him and other men disembarking, including Doyle and another soldier carrying the radio to shore.(37) The heavy resistance was confirmed by B Company’s Action Report.*
On June 25, 1944, Kays wrote that once in the water, he ran for a tank 50 yards toward shore amidst a "hail of M.G. [machine gun] fire all around us," from somewhere to his right front. Once sheltered behind it, he looked around and saw Capa shooting pictures from behind another tank. Kays stated in his letter that this was the last time he saw Capa, did not see him ashore and speculated that he left the area on a returning boat.
This account is detailed and very clear in Kays’s book, Letters from a Soldier.** Kays went on after the war to become the Dean of Engineering at Stanford University and pivotal in the development of Silicon Valley, hardly an unreliable participant or witness.
Of course, Coleman and Herrick dismiss this account. A reader of Coleman's blog, who helped Kays write an article about his book, brought the account to Colemans attention,(38) but Coleman simply told him that he didn’t know what he was talking about, and referred him to Herrick's analysis of Kays' story.(39)
Another blog reader, Maureen Doyle Sullivan, the daughter of Lenny Doyle (Kays' radio operator) confirmed the story told by Kays, and stated that her father was one of the soldiers laying in the sand by a hedgehog in a Capa picture. Coleman condescendingly dismissed Ms. Sullivan’s claims as well, and referred her to Herrick's analysis.
So, what is Herrick's analysis of Kays' testimony? Herrick acknowledges that Kays' story was based on letters he wrote contemporaneously, so they should be accurate, but states that the letters do not sound "authentic." Further evidence of Kays' mendacity, according to Herrick, is that Kays referred to Capa as a "Life photographer," which Herrick felt sounded awkward, and that "it would have sounded much more natural if Kays had simply said "'A photographer from Life was next to me in the boat,' omitting the name, since Capa's name recognition was not really widespread at that point." [even though Picture Post magazine had referred to Capa as "the world's greatest war photographer,” Capa had been widely published for years, and they had spent several days together on the Chase, where Kays doubtless learned of Capa's reputation. Herrick himself stated that men on the boat knew that Capa was “world renown.” page 189] Herrick opined that Kays' letters lacked "the ring of authenticity for a letter written in June 1944."
Just to be clear, Herrick claims that syntax in a letter home in 1944, from a weary soldier in an active combat zone, who just had survived hell, is evidence that Kays exaggerated and embellished his story.
But to really make his point, Herrick refutes Kays' daughter and Kays' contemporaneous account by saying there was no tank in the location Kays described. The problem with this argument is that Kays did not describe his location in his letters or his memoir. He just said he was by a tank, but not which tank. Herrick assumes it is the center tank in Negative 32, but it could have been any tank.
Herrick then said, "Furthermore, Capa stopped first to shelter behind a 'hedgehog' obstacle for an undetermined period of time, then moved to the shelter of tank dozer 10." But, Capa’s pictures proved this statement false in the second blog post.
That’s not all…
Not giving up, Herrick then refers again to the water level in Sargent's picture vs. Capa's picture as conclusive proof of the Stanford dean's mendacity, which I have already shown to be an specious comparison. Herrick confidently proclaims, "This definitively disproves Kays's assertion that Capa rode in on the same landing craft with him and the commander of the 1st Battalion."
In fact, as I have shown in this lengthy and laboriously detailed post, Herrick proved none of his assertions. Thus, the Clan’s argument that Capa was not in the water long enough to have gone to the beach to shoot his second roll of film falls flat on its face.
Thank you for your patience, but I think you probably now know why I had to go into so much detail. Now, as promised, on to the Darkroom Mishap.
*https://www.americandday.org/Documents/1st_ID-16th_IR-1st_Bn-B_Company-Account.html
** William M. Kays, Letters from a Soldier: A Memoir of World War II. Create Space. 2010.
35. https://warchronicle.com/16th-infantry-situation-on-d-day/
36. https://www.nearbycafe.com/artandphoto/photocritic/2015/08/02/alternate-history-robert-capa-on-d-day-25/
37. https://www.nearbycafe.com/artandphoto/photocritic/2015/08/02/alternate-history-robert-capa-on-d-day-25/
38. https://www.nearbycafe.com/artandphoto/photocritic/2019/02/12/alternate-history-robert-capa-on-d-day-40a/
39. https://www.nearbycafe.com/artandphoto/photocritic/2019/05/20/guest-post-27-charles-herrick-on-capas-d-day-i/